The mind behind anthropomorphic thinking: attribution of mental states to other species  by Urquiza-Haas, Esmeralda G. & Kotrschal, Kurt
lable at ScienceDirect
Animal Behaviour 109 (2015) 167e176Contents lists avaiAnimal Behaviour
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/anbehavReviewThe mind behind anthropomorphic thinking: attribution of mental
states to other species
Esmeralda G. Urquiza-Haas a, b, *, Kurt Kotrschal a
a Department of Behavioral Biology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
b Department of Cognitive Biology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austriaa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 10 March 2015
Initial acceptance 13 May 2015
Final acceptance 27 July 2015
Available online 21 September 2015
MS. number: 15-00191R
Keywords:
animals
anthropomorphism
dual process theory
empathy
reasoning
social cognition* Correspondence: E. G. Urquiza-Haas, Departmen
versity of Vienna, UZA 1 Biologiezentrum, Althanstra
E-mail address: esmeralda.urquiza@univie.ac.at (E
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.08.011
0003-3472/© 2015 The Authors. Published on behalf
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)Humans readily attribute intentionality and mental states to living and nonliving entities, a phenomenon
known as anthropomorphism. Recent efforts to understand the driving forces behind anthropomor-
phism have focused on its motivational underpinnings. By contrast, the underlying cognitive and neu-
ropsychological processes have not been considered in detail so far. The marked increase in interest in
anthropomorphism and its consequences for animal welfare, conservation and even as a potential
constraint in animal behaviour research call for an integrative review. We identify a set of potential
cognitive mechanisms underlying the attribution of mental states to nonhuman animals using a dual
process framework. We propose that mental state attributions are supported by processes evolved in the
social domain, such as motor matching mechanisms and empathy, as well as by domain-general
mechanisms such as inductive and causal reasoning. We conclude that the activation of these domain-
speciﬁc and domain-general mechanisms depend on the type of information available to the observer,
and suggest a series of hypotheses for testing the proposed model.
© 2015 The Authors. Published on behalf of The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour by Elsevier
Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).It may be considered a human universal to anthropomorphize
the relevant subjects and objects in one's environment. Anthro-
pomorphism is deﬁned as the attribution of human characteristics
or behaviour to any other nonhuman entity in the environment
and includes phenomena as diverse as attributing thoughts and
emotions to both domestic and wild animals, to dressing a
Chihuahua dog as a baby, or interpreting deities as human. Several
authors have addressed the multifaceted nature of anthropomor-
phism (Kracher, 2002). Fisher (1991) identiﬁed two different ways
in which people engage in anthropomorphic thinking. He deﬁned
‘interpretative’ anthropomorphism as the attribution of intentions,
beliefs and emotions to nonhuman agents based on their behav-
iour and ‘imaginative’ anthropomorphism as the representation of
imaginary and ﬁctional characters as human-like. Representing
gods as human-like or as having human-like characteristics such
as personalities, emotions and interests is an example of what
Fischer (1991) deﬁned as imaginative anthropomorphism. Infer-
ring that our cat is hungry because it sits in front of the fridge and
meows or that a dog is soliciting play when it barks at us aret of Cognitive Biology, Uni-
ße 14, 1090 Vienna, Austria.
. G. Urquiza-Haas).
of The Association for the Study o
.instances of interpretative anthropomorphism. In this review, we
focus mainly on interpretative anthropomorphism, that is, in the
attribution of mental states to other animals. Mental states are
understood here as brain events that are causally linked to
observed behaviour.
Animals are by far the most frequent nonhuman targets of
people's attribution of mental states, perhaps because humans
seem to be biophilic, that is, instinctively and intensely interested
in nature and animals (Wilson, 1984). Babies pay more attention
to animals than to any other kind of object in their environment
(DeLoache, Pickard, & LoBue, 2011). Even 2-day-old babies prefer
to look at point light displays of biological motion to other kinds
of motion (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008). In addition, the ﬁrst
words children produce are nouns, including proper names and
common names of small objects, food items and animals (Nelson,
1973). Caselli et al. (1995) using parental report data of 659 En-
glish and 195 Italian infants between 8 and 16 months of age
found that animal names and sound effects of animals (woof,
meow, quack, moo, etc.) were among the ﬁrst 50 words produced
by infants. The younger the children, the more this is the case and
the greater also their interest in animals (Wedl & Kotrschal, 2009).
Even among adults, living beings engage the attention of people
more than objects do (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). The
evolutionary logic behind this is that paying selective attention tof Animal Behaviour by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
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Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005). Conspeciﬁcs and hetero-
speciﬁcs are, after all, among the strongest agents of selection for
living beings (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979).
Many consequences of anthropomorphism are known. For
example, people are more willing to pay for the conservation of
animals than plants and more for vertebrates than for in-
vertebrates, regardless of the roles of these organisms in ecosystem
functioning or of their taxonomic uniqueness (Martín-Lopez,
Montes, & Benayas, 2007). A similar tendency holds even for
governmental decision making: species that are phylogenetically
closer to humans or are similar in appearance to humans receive a
higher share of conservation funds and policy attention (Martín-
Fores, Martín-Lopez, & Montes, 2013). The closer the morpholog-
ical and behavioural resemblance of animals to humans, the more
people tend to project human characteristics and, more speciﬁcally,
human mental states on them (Driscoll, 1995; Eddy, Gallup, &
Povinelli, 1993; Harrison & Hall, 2010; Herzog & Galvin, 1997;
Nakajima, Arimitsu, & Lattal, 2002). Perceiving or inferring that
other living beings have certain mental states such as emotions or
awareness also has important consequences for their moral status
(Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Gray et al. (2007) found that living
beings that are thought to experience emotions, including the ca-
pacity to feel pleasure and pain, are more likely to be attributed
with moral rights. In particular, beings that are considered intelli-
gent and aware are held responsible for their actions (Gray et al.,
2007). Linking worthiness of protection with anthropomorphic
features is even common in the ﬁeld of animal ethics (Singer, 1975;
Würbel, 2009).
The debate about the nature and implications of anthropo-
morphism has rarely been neutral or scientiﬁcally objective but has
focusedmainly on its fallacious essence (e.g. Kennedy, 1992), which
has diverted attention away from the goal of understanding the
nature of the phenomenon. The term itself is not clearly deﬁned
and can have multiple meanings and, most importantly, multiple
implications. For example, by labelling the attribution of jealousy to
our dog as anthropomorphic, does this mean that dogs are not
capable of feeling jealous because jealousy is an emotion that only
humans can feel, or that we cannot establish with objectivity what
our dog is experiencing because humans and dogs have a
completely different ‘Innenwelt’ and ‘Umwelt’ (von Uexküll, 1909).
Both are historical theoretical positions that have long been at the
centre of the debate about anthropomorphism, but will not be
addressed here. Recent results on dog inequity aversion (Range,
Horn, Viranyi, & Huber, 2009) and on the general homologies in
the social brains of mammals and other vertebrates (Goodson,
2005) hint at the possibility that much of what has been consid-
ered as anthropomorphic interpretations may in fact do more
justice to the mental states of other animals than was previously
believed. In the present review, we focus on anthropomorphism as
the result of a set of cognitive processes, but we do not make any
assumption regarding the uniqueness or accuracy of these
attributions.
WHY ANTHROPOMORPHIZE? CURRENT HYPOTHESES
Several hypotheses about the nature of anthropomorphism have
been proposed. Some of these try to explain anthropomorphism in
general, while others are particularly aimed at mind attribution to
other species. Based on the archaeological evidence that marks the
transition between the Middle and the Upper Palaeolithic some
60 000 years ago, Mithen (1996) proposed that the structure of the
human brain underwent a reorganization that involved the
connection of previously separated and specialized mental mod-
ules. According to this hypothesis, anthropomorphism resultedfrom the ‘talk’ between a putative social intelligence module,
specialized in dealing with the complexity of social interactions,
and a natural history module, processing information related to the
biological domain. Even though according to this hypothesis,
anthropomorphism initially arose as an emergent property, it soon
became relevant to human ﬁtness as it potentially increased
hunting success and eventually set the stage for animal domesti-
cation (Mithen, 1996).
Anthropomorphism has also been proposed to be a result of a
cognitive default state. The main idea behind this hypothesis is that
the human brain evolved to efﬁciently process social information.
Within this framework, anthropomorphism emerges as an auto-
matic response to any human-like behaviour (Caporael & Heyes,
1997) or human-like feature (Guthrie, 1997) that requires a swift
identiﬁcation or interpretation, which cannot be accounted for
using the knowledge at hand. The cognitive default hypothesis
proposed by Caporael and Heyes (1997), which is similar to Den-
nett's ‘intentional stance’, is based on an underlying assumption
that every behaviour is produced by internal mental states
(Dennett, 1971). According to these hypotheses, this human-
centred intentional stance is gradually restrained as soon as alter-
native explanations or suitable terms to explain or describe the
behaviour of another nonhuman entity become available (Caporael
& Heyes, 1997). Slightly different in its core assumptions, the
‘cognitive default’ proposed by Guthrie (1997) is portrayed as a host
of mechanisms evolved to interpret any ambiguous stimulus in the
environment as human-like or human-related.
Caporael and Heyes (1997) also discussed the possibility that at
least some mental state attribution to other species might be a
result of interspeciﬁc behaviour recognition. Humans share a series
of behaviour patterns and social brain and physiological mecha-
nisms with other species (e.g. Goodson, 2005), which evolved
through either common descent or convergent evolution, and this
may potentially allow for a certain interspeciﬁc understanding
(Caporael & Heyes, 1997; Julius, Beetz, Kotrschal, Turner, & Uvn€as-
Moberg, 2012). Based on this hypothesis, anthropomorphism is not
entirely arbitrary, since the attribution of mental states is partially
rooted in common mental and behavioural substrates in humans
and other animals.
A recent theoretical model of anthropomorphism developed by
Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2007) proposes that anthropomor-
phizing has strong motivational triggers, particularly effectance
and sociality. The ﬁrst is described as the need to make sense of the
actions of other agents to reduce uncertainty concerning their
behaviour, and the second refers to the need of people to maintain
social connections. It is therefore expected to ﬁnd an increased
tendency to anthropomorphize in situations of high cognitive load
(e.g. situations in which a lot of information needs to be processed
at the same time) and in social isolation (Waytz, Gray, Epley, &
Wegner, 2010).
One of the main shortcomings of previous hypotheses is their
lack of focus on the proximate mechanisms triggering anthropo-
morphism. Even though many authors have already proposed that
mind attribution is based on the same processes engaged in social
cognition (Epley et al., 2007; Kwan, Gosling, & John, 2008; Waytz
et al., 2010), only a few systematic studies have identiﬁed the
speciﬁc processes, triggers and factors inﬂuencing these attribu-
tions (Barrett, 2005).
Our aim in the present paper is to review the available evidence
concerning the cognitive processes involved in the attribution of
mind to nonhuman animals, and to propose a framework that in-
tegrates the functional and mechanistic aspects of anthropomor-
phism. Based on this reviewwe discuss previousmodels in the light
of the proposed framework and discuss some of the potential im-
plications and predictions derived from it.
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INVOLVED
Mental representations such as those involved in anthropo-
morphism probably show a cognitive dynamic conforming to the
‘iterative reprocessing model’ (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007) in
which mental representations or evaluations are generated
through a continuous and iterative processing by limbic and
cortical brain structures. According to this model, implicit cognitive
mechanisms are responsible for the emergence of early evaluations,
whereas representations that are more detailed emerge later as a
result of the involvement of reﬂective processes. Reﬂective or
explicit cognitivemechanisms are considered to be domain-general
mechanisms that are subject to conscious control, are effortful, are
slower than automatic processes, are limited by working memory
capacity, and appear late in ontogeny and evolution (Evans, 2008).
Implicit cognitive mechanisms are regarded as automatic, fast and
effortless, not subject to conscious control and specialized in
certain information domains. Evidence suggests that they appeared
early in human ontogeny and evolved early in the brain (Evans,
2008). Our review is organized according to this distinction,
beginning with implicit processes.
Implicit Processes
Agency detection and social cognition
Recent imaging studies support the long-standing belief about
how the brain deals with different aspects of the world, i.e. that
there is a neural distinction in the processing of the physical and
social aspects of the world, commonly labelled as ‘physical’ and
‘social’ cognition. For example, the processing of objects and sub-
jects is segregated in the visual ventral pathway (Caramazza &
Mahon, 2003; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Chao, Haxby, & Martin,
1999; Mahon, Anzellotti, Schwarzbach, Zampini, & Caramazza,
2009; Martin, 2007), and there is evidence for two differentiated
and extended systems that are specialized in each of these domains
(Jack et al., 2013; Martin & Weisberg, 2003). These two networks
maintain connectivity during the resting state (Simmons & Martin,
2012) and are mutually suppressed when either of them is active
(Jack et al., 2013). The social network in the brain consists of a series
of interconnected areas including the superior temporal sulcus,
lateral fusiform gyrus, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate,
insula and amygdala, and shows activity overlap with the so-called
default mode network (DMN; Goodson, 2005; Mars et al., 2012).
This has led some authors to propose that social cognition is the
default mode or baseline state of thought (Iacoboni et al., 2004; Jack
et al., 2013; Tavares, Lawrence, & Barnard, 2008).
The social network can be triggered in a bottom-up or a top-
down fashion, both involving the activation of the posterior supe-
rior temporal sulcus (pSTS; Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin, 2007).
The pSTS has been described as a ‘social-information processing’
centre (Watson, Latinus, Charest, Crabbe, & Belin, 2014), and as ‘the
hub for the distributed brain network for social perception’ since it
is functionally connected to a host of brain circuits that process
speciﬁc social information (Lahnakoski et al., 2012). The pSTS is
highly sensitive to biological motion, human body motion, hand
and mouth movement and facial expressions, as revealed by using
either point-light displays or natural biological stimuli (for a review
see Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Giese & Poggio, 2003; Vaina,
Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, & Belliveau, 2001).
Entities that induce the activation of the pSTS apart from other
humans include animals (Chao et al., 1999; Kaiser, Shiffrar, &
Pelphrey, 2012), robotic faces producing emotional expressions
(Gobbini et al., 2011), animate-like entities with perceived goals
such as robots (Shultz, Lee, Pelphrey, & McCarthy, 2011), or evenanimated geometric shapes (Blakemore et al., 2003; Castelli,
Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Gao, Newman, & Scholl, 2009; Osaka,
Ikeda, & Osaka, 2012; Schultz, Friston, O'Doherty, Wolpert, &
Frith, 2005).
Any stimuli indicating animacy will automatically activate the
pSTS. However, pSTS activity can also be induced by biasing par-
ticipants towards looking for intentional motion in randomly
moving dots (Lee, Gao, & McCarthy, 2012), for example by asking
people to look for eyes instead of a car in ambiguous visual stimuli
(Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004), or by making participants
believe that they are playing with a person instead of a computer
(Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004). It can also be
activated by instructing participants to predict the movement of
two interactive dots (Schultz, Imamizu, Kawato, & Firth, 2004), or
by cueing individuals to focus on the social interaction depicted by
the movement of two dots rather than on their kinematic proper-
ties (Tavares et al., 2008). In fact, it has been shown that biasing
people towards perceiving a moving stimulus as animate increases
activity in the entire social network of the brain (i.e. superior
temporal sulcus, lateral fusiform gyrus, medial prefrontal cortex,
posterior cingulate, insula and amygdala), suggesting that
perceiving animacy prepares the brain network to process social
information (Wheatley et al., 2007).
Motor matching mechanisms
Early theories of social cognition focused on two different ways
inwhich peoplewere thought to gain access to the internal states of
others: either by building a cognitive theory about why and how
mental states arise, or by using one's own mind to simulate the
mind of others (Goldman, 2006). The second hypothesis received
strong support by the discovery of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’
(MN; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). MN
were found to ﬁre when a monkey performed a certain action, but
also when it saw an experimenter perform the same action. Hence,
MNs were deﬁned as a cortical system that matches observation
and execution of motor actions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) in ani-
mals, including humans (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, &
Fried, 2010). The MN system is regarded as the neuronal hard-
ware for motor imitation, but also for synchronizing behaviours
and emotions within groups (Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008).
However, can people employ this automatic and embodied
process when dealing with other species? It seems that they do so,
not only with other animals (Buccino et al., 2004) but also with
robots (Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007; Kupferberg
et al., 2012). The generality of this process indicates that the MN
system may be less dependent on species-speciﬁc shape features
than on general motor properties of subjects, animated such as in
animals, or evoking the impression of animacy, such as in robots.
Results of a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
showed that when people observed motor actions of humans
(talking, reading and biting), monkeys (lip smacking and biting) or
dogs (barking and biting), the difference in activation of the motor
and visual areas depended not on the species but on the actions
shown (Buccino et al., 2004). Actions that are part of the observer's
motor repertoire (talking, reading and biting) are processed by
their motor system, including MN, while actions that are not in the
observer's repertoire (lip smacking and barking) are processed
based only on their visual properties.
The anatomical conﬁguration of nonhuman animals could also
be of great importance for the involvement of motor matching
mechanisms as triggers of mental state attribution. Kupferberg
et al. (2012) asked participants in their study to perform a hori-
zontal or vertical armmovement while watching another person or
robot (humanoid robot and a robot armwith andwithout a human-
like joint conﬁguration) performing a congruent or incongruent
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induced motor interference, which is an increase in movement
variance resulting from a mismatch between an intended and
observed action, only when it had a human-like joint conﬁguration.
Empathy for pain
Disregarding the heterogeneous history of the concept of
empathy, it is generally accepted that it refers to the ability of
people to recognize, understand and share other people's feelings
(Preston & de Waal, 2002). Studies assessing human empathy to-
wards other species have found that physiological arousal triggered
by apparent animal suffering are greatly affected by the phyloge-
netic distance between animals and humans (Westbury &
Neumann, 2008). fMRI studies have conﬁrmed that people
engage the same brain areas when observing animal distress as
when observing human distress (Filippi et al., 2010; Franklin et al.,
2013). Filippi et al. (2010) compared the brain response of vege-
tarians, vegans and omnivores when observing negative scenes
involving either animals or humans and found that vegetarians
show a higher engagement of empathy-related areas (anterior
cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus) than omnivores. Using a
similar paradigm, Franklin et al. (2013) found some overlapping
areas that were active when people were observing animal and
human suffering, including the anterior cingulate cortex and the
anterior insula. A comparison between the two conditions (dog
suffering versus human suffering) still revealed some differences.
Human suffering showed a stronger involvement of the medial
prefrontal cortex (among other brain regions), which is associated
with cognitive empathy and theory of mind (ToM), while observing
animal suffering elicited a greater response of the inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) and the anterior insula (Franklin et al., 2013). This
suggests that animal suffering elicited a greater emotional response
than human suffering, while the enhanced activity in the IFG in-
dicates a higher allocation of attention (Franklin et al., 2013).
Evolved schemata and mental representations
Evolved schemata or evolved mental representations may be
conceptualized as perceptual, motivational, learning or processing
biases. The notion of genetically determined or species-speciﬁc
learning biases was ﬁrst proposed by Lorenz (1965; the ‘innate
schoolmarm’ concept), and developed further by Gould and Marler
(1987; ‘instinct to learn’) in response to the behaviouristic
perspective of animal behaviour. The main idea conveyed by these
concepts is that depending on evolutionary history, different species
will still have different learning biases, despite similar or even
identical learning mechanisms, pointing at heritable components of
mental representations. Based on comparative studies, Gould and
Marler (1987) collected ample evidence for this. For example,
newly hatched greylag, Anser anser, goslings pay keen attention to
their parents' beaks, producing the kind of local enhancement that
facilitates learning about food (Fritz, Bisenberger,& Kotrschal, 2000).
Humans use motion as a cue for intention and emotion attri-
bution (for a review, see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), which has led
some authors to suggest the presence of a bias for the represen-
tation of recurring patterns of interactions over their evolutionary
history (Barrett, 2005; Barrett et al., 2005; Blythe, Todd, & Miller,
1999). According to these authors, being able to discern an
aggressive from a playful interaction had important ﬁtness conse-
quences, which created a selection pressure for such a learning bias
(i.e. one that enabled individuals to recognize these interactions
frommotion cues alone). It has been demonstrated by using simple
dot animations that people accurately represent and identify
animated interactions (including chasing, playing and ﬁghting,
among others; Blythe et al., 1999). This ability is independent of
cultural background, and improves with age (Barrett et al., 2005).Similar biases are proposed for the representation of emotional
expressions (Lepp€anen&Nelson, 2009). Humans convey emotional
states not only through facial expressions but also through vocali-
zations as well as body motion, and consistently interpret emotions
of moving agents (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004;
Crane & Gross, 2007; Karg, Kühnlenz, & Buss, 2010), independent
of shape (McDonnell, J€org, McHugh, Newell, & O'Sullivan, 2009).
The principles of the expression of emotions are identical between
species (Darwin, 1872) while the form is, of course, species-speciﬁc
(Tinbergen, 1963). This connects to our conclusions about the MN
system (above) and raises the possibility that nonhuman animal
behaviour is perceived and interpreted via the same mechanisms
that evolved mainly for within-species social communication. In
other words, if the behaviours displayed by animals contain similar
kinematic parameters as would be the case in the human expres-
sion of emotion, then the same attribution of emotionwill bemade.
We suggest that this may particularly apply to a limited set of basic
emotions shared by humans and animals (Damasio, 1994;
Panksepp & Biven, 2012). If the recognition or attribution of such
basic emotions is indeed deﬁned by a set of kinematic parameters,
this would also explain why primary emotions are more readily
attributed to other animals than more complex emotions (Morris,
Doe, & Godsell, 2008), or any other kind of mental states (Gray
et al., 2007) that may be speciﬁcally human.
In conclusion, it seems that the attribution of a speciﬁc state
(wants, beliefs, emotions) to another being can be substantially
supported through automatic processes. In the following, we
intend to integrate mechanisms which involve voluntary control
and, to some extent, ‘higher’ cognitive processes.Reﬂective Processes
Inductive reasoning
Inductive or inferential reasoning has been traditionally implied
in the attribution of mental states to others, including other species
(Epley et al., 2007; Kwan et al., 2008). Inductive reasoning is
regarded as the process whereby knowledge is transferred from
known subjects/objects to novel or unknown ones (Heit, 2000).
Induction can be achieved by inferring that x0 has the same prop-
erty as x because they belong to the same category of objects or
beings, or by computing the perceived similarity between x0 and x
(Weber, Thompson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby, & Parsons, 2009). The
ﬁrst process is known as category-based induction and the second
as similarity-based induction (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). Similarity-
based induction is appliedwhen no conceptual information is given
to children regarding the property of a novel object, and they have
to rely on the physical similarity between the novel and the known
object to infer the properties of the novel object (Sloutsky & Fisher,
2004; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007; Welder & Graham, 2001).
Children seem to develop the ability to make category-based in-
ferences when they are 4 or 5 years old (Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005).
There is evidence for the use of similarity- and category-based
induction when humans reason about the mental states of ani-
mals. When people are asked whether they believe that animals
can experience mental states, two main trends emerge. First,
attribution scores show a scala naturae distribution. That is, the
attribution of intelligence (Driscoll, 1995; Nakajima et al., 2002),
self-recognition, intention recognition, the ability to deceive (Eddy
et al., 1993), the capacity for higher mental processes (Herzog &
Galvin, 1997) and the attribution of empathic and communicative
abilities (Harrison & Hall, 2010) are strongly correlated with
perceived similarity and phylogenetic relatedness to humans.
These ﬁndings support the hypothesis that similarity-based in-
duction is used in attributing mental states to animals.
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this distribution, since the kind of mental state in question also has
an important inﬂuence on the inductive process. Basic mental
states or abilities such as the ability to sense, perceive and feel are
attributed more easily to a wide range of animals than complex
mental states or higher cognitive abilities such as enumerating,
sorting, morality, memory and foresight (Gray et al., 2007; Herzog
& Galvin, 1997; Rasmussen, Rajecki, & Craft, 1993). Emotion attri-
bution follows a similar trend. Primary emotions (fear, curiosity,
joy, affection, surprise, sadness, anxiety, anger and disgust) are
attributed more frequently to a wider range of animals than sec-
ondary emotions (embarrassment, shame, grief, guilt, empathy,
pride and jealousy; Morris et al., 2008). We suggest that some
mental states have more straightforward mental representations
than others do; that is, people have a limited set of mental repre-
sentations about what the state of being angry, happy, sad or sur-
prised looks like. However, such mental images may not be
available for cognitive states or abilities such as intelligence,
memory or foresight, thereby affecting the inductive process.
Causal reasoning
Reﬂections on animals, nature in general and differences or
similarities between humans and other animals are found in
virtually all human cultures (Descola, 2006). These ideas about
other living beings, which are shared within or even between
cultures, are key elements used in reasoning about the mental
states of animals. To give just an example, Descola (2006) proposed
that the ontologies of living beings could be grouped into four
categories: animism, totemism, analogism and naturalism.
Animism, which seems a universal worldview of all hunter-
gatherers, is particularly prevalent in many Native American, Si-
berian (Willerslev, 2004) and Amerindian cultures (Viveiros de
Castro, 1998). It is characterized by a belief that all living beings
share the same or similar ‘interiorities’, that is the same funda-
mental properties with regard to their inner essences, but it rec-
ognizes the dissimilarity in their physical aspect and behaviour.
Naturalism, on the other hand, is based on the idea that humans
share with all animals similar physical properties (cells, organs,
tissues, etc.) but differ from them in other inner properties, es-
sences or capacities. Therefore, any inference about the mental
state of an animal by a person from an animistic culturemight differ
from that in a naturalistic culture, just because their underlying
premises do not allow them to reach the same conclusions.
However, social traditions are only one component in building
speciﬁc individual representations. People may also apply acquired
knowledge about their social world, such as the learned associa-
tions between speciﬁc behaviours and their internal causes (e.g.
hunger precedes eating), as well as the external causes that might
trigger speciﬁc mental states (e.g. engaging in play induces joy).
People frequently use such behavioural and contextual information
when dealing with nonhuman animals, too (Horowitz & Bekoff,
2007; Mitchell & Hamm, 1997). For example, when people are
told stories about animals, they tend to relymore on the description
of the behaviour and its context when assessing emotions (jeal-
ousy) and intentions (deception) than on morphological similarity
or phylogenetic closeness (Mitchell & Hamm, 1997). Likewise, dog
owners tend to attribute pleasure and enjoyment to their dogs as a
result of successful play bouts, that is, play sessions in which dogs
and owners interact reciprocally (Horowitz & Bekoff, 2007).
RETHINKING ATTRIBUTION OF MENTAL STATES TO
NONHUMAN ANIMALS
It seems that the attribution of mental states to animals is not
simply a by-product of misplaced social cognition but is rather anunavoidable consequence of the functional organization of the
human brain. The physical network alone is insufﬁcient to explain
and predict the direction and speed of movement of a herd of
running antelopes in the presence of a pride of lions, or the gaze of
an eagle towards its potential prey. In most cases, information that
rules the movement of objects cannot be used to predict the
movement or behaviour of agents. Once agency is detected, a set of
domain-speciﬁc and domain-general cognitive processes come into
play to process the content of the mind of the subject in focus. The
evidence reviewed here suggests the involvement of both auto-
matic and reﬂective processes such asmotormatchingmechanisms
and evolved schemata, as well as inductive and causal reasoning.
The activation of the social network, which is at the core of
anthropomorphizing, may not always be triggered by default at the
sight or sound of a living or living-seeming entity. Evidence sug-
gests that the chronic suppression of the bottom-up response of the
social network is possible. For example, Cheng et al. (2007) per-
formed a study to compare the neural response of physicians and
matched control participants to the observation of both hands and
feet being pricked by a needle or just touched with a cotton bud
(cotton swab). Seeing a needle prick activated the so-called pain
matrix (dorsal anterior cingular cortex, anterior insula and peri-
aqueductal grey) in control participants, but not in physicians, who
showed activated areas related to self-regulation and executive
attention instead (Cheng et al., 2007). A subsequent study did
indeed show that the speciﬁc neural responses of physicians are
due to an inhibition of their bottom-up processing of pain
perception (Decety, Yang, & Cheng, 2010). Paul & Podberscek
(2000) found that veterinary students showed lower levels of
empathy and belief in animal sentience during their third year of
study than in their ﬁrst. We believe that this might be the result of
the chronic suppression of the social network when dealing with
animals during veterinary education.
Since anthropomorphism is rooted in social cognition, we pre-
dict that individual differences in empathy or even ToM in humans
will correlate with the tendency to attribute mental states to other
species. This is supported by the ﬁnding that empathy is positively
correlated with attitudes against the use of animals in research and
in testing of nonmedical products (Furnham, McManus, & Scott,
2003), with attitudes towards animal welfare (Taylor & Signal,
2005) and with beliefs in animal mind and empathy towards ani-
mals (Apostol, Rebega, & Miclea, 2013). The more individuals are
empathic, the more they respond to perceived animal pain or
misfortune (Norring, Wikman, Hokkanen, Kujala, & H€anninen,
2014; Westbury & Neumann, 2008). Additionally, gender, one of
the strongest predictors of concerns about animal welfare (Kellert
& Berry, 1987), is consistently correlated with empathy (Baron-
Cohen, 2002; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Women
generally score higher than men on various measures of positive
attitudes towards animals, show less approval towards the use of
animals for medical and scientiﬁc research, and score higher in the
animal attitude scale (Driscoll, 1995; Furnham et al., 2003; Knight,
Vrij, Cherryman, & Nunkoosing, 2004; Swami, Furnham, &
Christopher, 2008; Taylor & Signal, 2005). Women also show
stronger affective and weaker utilitarian attitudes towards
nonhuman animals than men, a greater concern for animal cruelty
issues, less support for their exploitation and subordination, and a
greater concern for animal rights and welfare (Kellert & Berry,
1987; Phillips et al., 2011).
Waytz et al. (2010) predicted that the tendency to anthropo-
morphize would increase in conditions of causal uncertainty and
in situations of high cognitive load. Cognitive load refers to the
extent of working memory available for the processing of infor-
mation in the context of the entire relevant information to be
processed at any given point in time (Engle, 2002). Baddeley
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the temporary storing of information used in complex cognitive
tasks such as reasoning, language comprehension and learning.
The working memory system is restricted by the quantity of in-
formation that it can hold (Cowan, 2010), and by the time lapse
during which information can be stored (Baddeley, Thomson, &
Buchanan, 1975). Increasing one or both at a time will lead to a
cognitive burden that reduces the mental resources to deal with
any primary task.
We suggest that a high cognitive load might affect mental state
attribution in very different ways depending on how it is triggered
in the ﬁrst place. In Fig. 1, we present an outline of the potential
engagement of physical and social cognition via automatic and
reﬂective processes in response to animated and unanimated en-
tities. We propose that a high cognitive load could interfere with
the suppression of the social network when triggered bottom-up
and with its activation when triggered top-down. It could in-
crease physiological responses to observed animal distress
through the inhibition of the top-down suppression of automatic
motor matching. In other words, a high cognitive load might in-
crease anthropomorphism only when triggered automatically
given the inhibition of executive functions capable of suppressing
attributions. In contrast, when anthropomorphism is steered top-
down a high cognitive load might instead prevent the emergence
of anthropomorphic attributions (Fig. 1). Only when objects haveProce
ent
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Physical c
Objectification of conspecifics and
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Figure 1. Engagement of physical and social cognition via automatic and rbeen chronically imbued with animate properties (e.g. animism),
and subjects have been chronically objectiﬁed (e.g. sexualized
women; Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011), cognitive load might not
have such a strong effect or no inﬂuence at all. Given the rela-
tionship between stress and empathy (Martin et al., 2015), we
expect the suppression of both bottom-up and top-down attri-
butions only in the presence of a stress-inducing high cognitive
load.
Although any kind of experience with animals will potentially
trigger the intentional bias, not all species are processed the same
way. Animals phylogenetically close to humans, such as chimpan-
zees, Pan troglodytes, differ so much from insects in terms of
anatomy, size, locomotion and behaviour that seeing them will
probably engage different processes (Fig. 2).
Automatic processes such as motor matching mechanisms will
probably be engaged as a result of observing animals displaying
behaviours that are familiar to humans, especially if their anatomy
and general conﬁguration resemble those of a person (Buccino
et al., 2004; Kupferberg et al., 2012). Thus we hypothesize that
the heterogeneity or homogeneity (i.e. variance) in the mental
states attributed to a given target or behaviour will reﬂect the type
of mechanisms involved. We suspect that high levels of agreement
in the attribution of mental states will be seen when the processes
involved are implicit or automatic, and a higher variance when
reﬂective mechanisms such as causal reasoning are used.ssed
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Figure 2. Hypothesized involvement of automatic and reﬂective cognitive processes
according to human/nonhuman animal behavioural and morphological similarities.
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Most previous hypotheses concerning anthropomorphism
postulate the involvement of social cognitive processes in cross-
species attribution of mental states. The cognitive default hypoth-
eses proposed by Caporael and Heyes (1997) and Guthrie (1997) are
supported by recent studies suggesting that the network for social
cognition might indeed be the ‘default state of the brain’ (Iacoboni
et al., 2004; Jack et al., 2013; Tavares et al., 2008). This is probably
the case for other species as well, since the core social network
governing the instinctive sociosexual behaviour in vertebrates has
remained essentially unchanged in structure and function for some
500 million years, virtually from ﬁsh to mammals (Goodson, 2005).
Hence, nonhuman animals may, as well, ‘animalize’ humans or
other animated but nonliving entities, at least by employing their
automatic neural processes. This is backed by observations that
humans are not the only species that respond socially to nonliving
stimuli. For example, studies in primates show that self-propelled
motor devices with conspeciﬁc-like features trigger intention
attribution in marmosets, Callithrix jacchus (Burkart, Kupferberg,
Glasauer, & van Schaik, 2011; Kupferberg, Glasauer, & Burkart,
2013) and that humanoid robots imitating the actions of chim-
panzees elicit social responses in the latter (Davila-Ross et al.,
2014). These ﬁndings suggest that the intentional bias triggered
by cues associated with living organisms evolved long before
modern humans emerged and before the putative reorganization of
the brain circuits may have occurred, as proposed by Mithen
(1996). In contrast to the bottom-up activation of the social
network, its activation in a top-down fashion may or may not be
shared with other species.
There is also evidence supporting the interspeciﬁc behaviour
recognition hypothesis. Humans may interpret animals based on
broadly shared common biopsychological grounds involved incoping with environmental, ecological and social challenges (Julius
et al., 2012). Comparative organismic biology reveals a series of
structures and mechanisms at different levels of behaviour, physi-
ology and brain that are shared between humans and other ani-
mals. This includes a core network that governs the instinctive
sociosexual behaviour in vertebrates (Goodson, 2005). This
network links social stimuli with hormonal responses and is at the
core of bonding (e.g. betweenmother and child and between sexual
partners) and of ‘falling in love’, and is part of the brain that gen-
erates basic emotions shared at least within mammals (Panksepp,
2005). A number of other features add to the shared toolbox of
humans and other animals for evaluating the world and for social
interactions. These include the similarities between species con-
cerning the principles of the expression of emotions and how ex-
pressions are decoded by others, the very conservative stress
system and how they are linked with social behaviour (Julius et al.,
2012), or the patterns of variability of individual behavioural
phenotype (i.e. temperament, personality) in groups and pop-
ulations (Sih, Bell, & Johnson, 2004). Such closeness in the ‘social
tools’ will contribute to the engagement of automatic or bottom-up
processing, thus prompting mental state attributions not only to be
more difﬁcult to avoid but also to be potentially more accurate. If
this is the case, mental state attribution would also have adaptive
aspects, as it would indeed create some basic predictability of the
behaviour of animals. People may therefore not be completely off
trackwhen trying to avoid a growling dog or a hissing cat, but this is
not always the case. For example, Meints, Racca, and Hickey (2010)
found that 69% of the 4-year-old children they studied interpreted
aggressive facial expressions in dogs as happy and smiling. Children
were clearly using the exposed teeth common in a smiling person
as a cue and matching it with the same feature in the dog. Inter-
preting an animal yawning as bored or relaxed, or a staring gorilla
as interested might indeed have some negative consequences for
the individual making such a mistake. Still, the question about the
accuracy of mental state attribution to other animals cannot be
answered here and is outside the scope of this review.
Early on, Dennett (1971) suggested that individuals engage in
different strategies when trying to predict the behaviour of
different entities in the world. The ‘physical stance’ works with
intuitive notions about physics, and is used whenever an individual
is trying to predict the trajectory of a kicked ball, a falling tree trunk
or when handling tools. The behaviour of subjects cannot be pre-
dicted by just using these rules. When dealing with subjects, the
best predictive strategy is to use the ‘intentional stance’ that is
implemented by a host of cognitive mechanisms subsumed by the
so-called social network. This might explain why the spontaneous
attribution of mind to nonhuman animals is literally unavoidable.
The identiﬁcation of the potential mechanisms involved in
anthropomorphic thinking should support more speciﬁc hypoth-
eses and predictions about the attribution of mental states not only
to animals but also to robots or other real or imagined human-like
entities. It also raises a wide range of interesting questions with
important ramiﬁcations for understanding the interaction between
both networks in mind attribution. For example, given that the
brain's social network underlies some of the attributions of mental
states to nonhuman animals, what would be the consequences of
reasoning about them in nonsocial terms, as economic goods, for
example? Could the differential activation of the social and phys-
ical networks explain the discrepancy in the treatment of animals
used as commodities versus pet animals? Examining the nature
and consequences of these interactions has the potential to provide
a new perspective on social exclusion, dehumanization, infrahu-
manization and sexual objectiﬁcation, given the involvement of
mind attribution as its core feature (Waytz, Schroeder, & Epley,
2014).
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Anthropomorphic interpretations of nonhuman entities, espe-
cially animals, are supported by a set of cognitive mechanisms.
Some of these processes, including motor matching mechanisms,
evolved schemata and empathy for pain from the social cognition
domain, are probably engaged in anthropomorphizing and mind
attribution in an automatic way. Attributions emerging through
these processes are expected to show a low intra- and interindi-
vidual variance, and to be less affected by cultural differences be-
tween people or by high cognitive load. In fact, a high cognitive load
might interfere with the suppression of these automatically trig-
gered attributions, rendering them more conspicuous and inevi-
table. By contrast, attributions resulting from processes that are
more reﬂective are expected to show a greater intra- and interin-
dividual variance, to be inﬂuenced by cultural differences and to be
affected by a high cognitive load. However, as these mechanisms
communicate and interact, anthropomorphic attributions will al-
ways be affected, to varying degrees, by both automatic and re-
ﬂexive processes.
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